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L Facts
At midnight on Sunday, November 1, 1987, Keith Garvin ("Keith")
arrived at the United States Navy base in Oceana, Virginia. He had just
spent the weekend with his wife, Dawn Garvin ("Garvin"), at their apart-
ment in Maryland. Upon his arrival to the base, he made several unsuccess-
ful attempts to call her. Concerned, Keith telephoned his father-in-law,
Frederick Romano ("Romano"), and asked him to check on Garvin. Roma-
no arrived at his daughter's apartment to find the door ajar, lights on, and
the television blaring. Upon entering the apartment, he found Garvin in
the bedroom, lying on the bed nude with a bottle protruding from her
vagina. Romano attempted to perform CPR and observed bleeding from
Garvin's forehead. He called the paramedics, who attempted to administer
CPR, but Garvin was dead.'
At 2:30 a.m. that morning, Detective James Roeder ("Roeder") of the
Baltimore County Police Department arrived at Garvin's apartment. He
testified that when he entered the apartment he observed clothing strewn
about the living room, including a pair of pants turned inside out and a
brassiere that was ripped and not unhooked. Roeder also found a piece of
rubber from a pair of tennis shoes in the living room. In the bedroom,
Roeder found two spent .25 caliber shell casings. The autopsy of Garvin's
body revealed that she died as a result of two contact gunshot wounds to the
head.2
The State's evidence against Steven Howard Oken ("Oken") consisted
primarily of the murder weapon, which was found in his home, and the
piece of rubber found in Garvin's apartment that matched Oken's shoe.
Several witnesses testified that Oken had attempted to gain entry into
residences in the vicinity of Garvin's apartment a few days before the
murder. Oken entered pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible.
On January 18, 1991, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
found Oken guilty of murder in the first degree, first degree sexual offense,
burglary, and-use of a handgun in a crime of violence.' The jury acquitted
1. Oken v. State, 612 A.2d 258, 261 (Md. 1992) (reviewing Oken's convictions and
sentences).
2. Id. at 261.
3. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENT S 407 (1999) ('[a]l murder... perpe-
trated by ... wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing shall be murder in the first degree").
The State sought the death penalty for the murder Oken committed because the murder was
committed while committing or attempting to commit ... a sexual offense in the first
degree." MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENT § 413(d)(10) (1999). This Maryland
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Oken of the robbery charge." He elected a bench trial on the issue of
criminal responsibility in which Judge Smith concluded that Oken was
criminally responsible.
On January 25, 1991, the same jury unanimouslysentenced Oken to
death based upon the agravating circumstance that the murder was com-
mitted in the commission of a first degree sexual offense.6  The jury re-
turned a verdict sheet indicating that less than twelve jurors found as
mitigating circumstances a preexisting life sentence in Maine,7 sexual sadism,
and substance abuse. Judge Smith imposed a sentence of life imprisonment
for the first degree sexual offense, and consecutive terms for the burglary
and handgun violation!
On direct review, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed Oken's
convictions for first degree murder and first degree sexual offense, as well
as his sentence of death, but reversed his conviction for burglary.9 The
court also rejected Oken's challenges to his conviction and sentence on
collateral review, affirming the lower court's denial of Oken's petition for
habeas relief.1" The federaldistrict court denied Oken's petition for writ of
habeas corpus."
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the federal district court's denial of petitioner's application for federal
habeas relief.' The court found that Oken procedurally defaulted his
Morgan" claim because he failed to raise the claim on direct appeal in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland and failed to demonstrate special circum-
stances that would excuse the waiver.1 4 The court also concuded that the
statute is comparable to capital murder under S 18.2-31(5) of the Vir nia Code. VA. CODE
ANN. S 18.2-31(5) (Michie 2000). An important difference is thatte'Maryland statute is
applied at the sentencing phase of the trial and the jury must find the aggravating circum-
stance beyond a reasonable doubt. S 413(d).
4. Oken v. State, 681 A.2d 30, 35 (Md. 1996).
5. Id. Criminal responsibility in Maryland is the proceeding that assesses mental
capacity. Id.
6. Id.; see S 413(d)(10); supra note 3.
7. Oken, 681 A.2d at 34. Less than two weeks after Oken murdered Garvin, he
sexually assaulted and murdered his sister-in-law, Patricia Hirt in his Maryland home. He
then fled to Maine where he murdered a desk clerk at a Maine hotel. A Maine court sen-
tenced Oken to life without parole for first degree murder. Oken was then returned to
Maryland to face separate prosecutions for the Garvin and Hirt homicides. Id.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Oken, 612 A.2d at 283.
10. Oken v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 259,263 (4th Cir. 2000); see Oken, 681 A.2d at 33.
11. Oken, 220 F.3d at 263.
12. Id. at 262.
13. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
14. Oken, 220 F.3d at 264; see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,733-34 (1992) (providing
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Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision to deny petitioner's Simmons"5
claim was not an unreasonable application of" or "contrary to" clearly
established federal law. 16
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit conducted review of Oken's habeas petition and
applied the United States Supreme Court's recent construction of 28 U.S.C.
S2254(d)(1)'s federal standard of review."' Williams provides that a federal
court may rant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus only in the following
situations: (1) the alecision of the state court is contrary to federal law when
a decision of law or application of law to fact is indistinguishable from the
precedent yet reaches a conclusion that is opposite and irreconcilable with
the identical issue addressed in the precedent; or (2) the decision of the state
court is an unreasonable application of federal law because it extends prece-
dent to a context which is not appropriate or fails to extend precedent to a
that petitioner's only method for removing biased jurors who would 'unwaveringly impose
death after a finding of guilt" is full and proper voir dire). The constitutional requirement
of an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments demands that defendant
receive an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. The identification of unqualified
jurors is achieved by sufficient inquiry into "whether the view of prospective jurors on the
death penalty would disqualify them from sitting. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 732. Oken asserted
that the trial court did not permit proper voir dire. Oken, 220 F.3d at 264.
15. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
16. Oken, 220 F.3d at 267; see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)
(finding that when defendant gives testimony at a suppression hearing, the "testimony
thereafter may not be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection" because it "is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surren-
dered in order to assert another"); see also Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, S 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
S 2254 (Supp. m 1997)).
Oken's other claims, which were denied, are not addressed in this case note. Oken
claimed insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction of the first degree sexual
offense. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel under the following theories: (1)
trial counsel failed to move for a mistrial after the prosecution's dosing argument; (2) trial
counsel erroneously advised Oken to enter a conditional guilty plea for the murder in Maine;
(3) trial counsel failed to present sufficient evidence of Oken's parole ineligibility under
Maine law; (4) and trial counsel failed to adduce sufficient evidence of Oken's substance abuse
at the time of the Garvin murder. The Fourth Circuit denied all of these claims because the
state court decision was not "contrary to," or an "unreasonable application of," federal law
under Strickland v. Washington. Oken, 220 F.3d at 268-71; see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that counsel is ineffective if there is a "reasonable probability
that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different").
17. Oken, 220 F.3d at 263; see § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)
(construing the language found in S 2254, which provides that a federal court is prohibited
from granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision was an
.unreasonable application of" dearly established federal law or "contrary to" clearly estab-
lished federal law); seealso Jeremy P. White, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF.J. 123 (2000) (analyzing
Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
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context which would be appropriate." .Put another way, a federal court
may grant habeas relief if the state court identified the correct legal principal
but unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."
A. Petitioner's Morgan Claim
Although the court held that Oken defaulted his Morgan claim,2" the
court alternatively applied the Williams standard of review to the merits of
Oken's claim that the state trial court's voir dire questions were constitu-
tionally inadequate under Morgan v. Illinois.21 The Fourth Circuit said that
the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision did not "unreasonably apply,"
nor was it "contrary to," the federal law as promulgated in Morgan. The
18. Oken, 220 F.3d at 263-64.
19. Id. at 264.
20. Id. The court held that Oken's Morgan claim was procedurally defaulted because
he failed to raise the claim on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, thereby
waiving this claim as a matter of state law and because he failed to demonstrate special
circumstances which would excuse the waiver. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISH-
MENT S 645A(c)(1) (1996) ("allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when petitioner
... intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation... on direct appeal ... unless
the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances").
The court found that the waiver of Oken's Morgan claim need not be "intelligent and
knowing" because the failure to raise a Morgan claim on direct appeal is the sort of strategic
decision of counsel that the Maryland courts have construed as falling outside the intended
scope of section 645A(c). See Oken, 681 A.2d at 37 (citing Curtis v. Maryland, 395 A.2d 464,
474 (1978)).
The court also found that the procedural default was properly applied because it was
"adequate" and 'independent" as required byJohnson v. Mississippi and Coleman v. Thompson.
Oken, 220 F.3d at 264-65; see Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (finding that a
procedural rule is "adequate" because it is "consistently or regularly applied"); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (finding that a procedural rule is "independent" of
federal law if the state court decision does not rest on federal law and is not interwoven with
federal law).
Oken failed to show that waiver would be a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" or
sufficient "cause" or "prejudice" existed to excuse the procedural default. Id. at 265; see
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The only "cause" Oken advanced for the procedural default was
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim which was also procedurally defaulted because it
was not mentioned in his opening brief to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See Oken, 681
A.2d at 36 n.5.
Consequently, it is worth alerting practitioner to the essential need to preserve claims
for federal habeas review by raising all constitutional claims at each level of state proceedings.
See generally Matthew K. Mahoney, Bridging the Procedural Default Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J.
305 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of preserving all claims of trial error for appeal and
collateral review).
21. Oken, 220 F.3d at 264; see Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734. In assessing the propriety of
voir dire in uncovering the biases of prospective jurors the court held that in order to satisfy
the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of an impartial jury, the defendant must be
permitted to conduct a sufficient inquiry to "identify those jurors who... had predetermined
whether to impose the death penalty [upon finding of guilt].' Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736.
22. Oken, 220 F.3d at 265.
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Morgan Court held that voir dire questions which only addressed general
fairness and the impartiality of the juror and did not probe into when the
juror would or would not impose the death penalty were insufficient." The
Fourth Circuit relied on its decision in United States v. Tipton,24 which held
that a question that asked about the prospective juror's attitude toward the
death penalty was sufficient to satisfy the Morgan requirements." The Oken
court concluded that the questions posed by the trial court during voir dire
adequately revealed whether a "potential juror's feelings about the death
penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."
26
In his concurrence, Judge Michael agreed that Oken's Morgan claim
was procedurally defaulted.2' However, he disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that, had the merits of Oken's Morgan claim been reached,
habeas relief was not warranted." Judge Michael said, [t]he majority's
treatment of the merits of the Morgan claim.., is dictum, but it is dictum
that I cannot join. I believe that the voir dire conducted in this case was
insufficient to identify jurors who would automatically impose the death
penalty upon conviction."29 'He asserted that the focus of the questions
strayed from the essential inquiry of whether the juror was able to give "due
consideration to mitigating evidence at sentencing" and the trial court failed
to explain to the jurors that they would consider mitigating and aggravating
23. Id. at 266.
24. 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
25. Oken, 220 F.3d at 266; see also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996)
(finding sufficient under the Morgan standard one question which asked the jury panel
whether potential juror's feelings about the death penalty were "strong").
26. Oken, 220 F.3d at 266 (construing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728). The court assessed the
following four questions that were initially asked to every member of the Oken's jury panel:
(1) Do you have any strong feelings, one way or the other, with regard to the
death penalty?
(2) Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the death penalty, would prevent or
substantially impair you from making a fair and impartial decision on whether
the Defendant is not guilty or guilty, based on the evidence presented and the
Court's instructions as to the law?
(3) Do you feel your attitude, regding the death penalty, would prevent or
substantially impair you from making a fair and impartial decision on whether
the Defendant was or was not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, based
on the evidence presented and the Court's instructions on the law?
(4) Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the death penalty would prevent or
substantially impair you from sentencing the Defendant, based upon the evidence
presented and the Court's instructions as to the law which is applicable?
The court found the questions a sufficient inquiry, under the Morgan standard, even if not
followed-up by any questions. Id. (citing Oken, 681 A.2d at 38-39).
27. Oken, 220 F.3d at 271 (Michael, J., concurring).




evidence at a separate sentencing phase?0 According to Judge Michael, voir
dire is inadequate if the questions do not probe into how the prospective
juror's "feelings about the death penalty" affect their decision-making. 1.
The questions addressed "general fairness" and failed under the Morgan
standard. 2 It is for these reasons that Judge Michael, had the issue not been
procedurally defaulted, would have found the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land's decision "contrary to" and an "unreasonable application" of federal
law. 33
B. Petitioner's Simmons Claim
The Fourth Circuit found that the Court of Appeals of Maryland's
decision to deny Oken's Simmons claim was not an "unreasonable applica-
tion of" or "contrary to" the rule set out in Simmons v. United States.'
Oken claimed that his right to testify at the criminal responsibility portion
of the proceedings was abridged because the testimony could be used against
him at the sentencing phase." His desire to assert his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, at the sentencing phase, allegedly would not
be available if he testified at the criminal responsibility portion of the
proceedings. 6 The court determined that the Simmons holding was limited
to the precise facts of that case; a defendant who testified in support of a
motion to suppress could not have that testimony used against him at trial.'
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily upon Supreme Court jurisprudence
which permitted the guilt/innocence phase and the sentencing phase of a
trial to be conducted by the same jury without a jury instruction that the
30. Id. at 275.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 274-75. The question in Morgan which was held to be proper for determining
the attitude of the juror toward the death penalty and mitigating evidence was the following:
"If you find [defendant) guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty
no matter what the facts are?" Morgan, 504 U.S. at 723; see Oken, 220 F.3d at 275. In Oken's
trial, the court rejected the following quite similar question: "Are there any murders or any
type of murders where no matter what excuses or explanations are offered, you would feel
that the person responsible should get the death penalty? What are they?" Oken, 220 F.3d
at 275. Judge Michael found the questions similar enough to decide that the trial court's
rejection of Oken's question should be reversible error. Id.
33. Oken, 220 F.3d at 276.
34. Id. at 267; see Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 (holding that defendant's testimony at
suppression hearing cannot be used against him at trial as to guilt/innocence because his
prerogative to testify on his behalf should not be used to abridge his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination).
35. Oken, 220 F.3d at 267 (relying not directly on the holding but on the "broadly
worded rationale offered by the Simmons court for its holding," the intolerability of having
to surrender one constitutional right in order to assert another).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 267 n.6.
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evidence of the first phase cannot be considered at the second phase. 8 The
court found no reason to believe that Oken's facts were distinguishable
from prior case law and would warrant a different result. 9
IV Conclusion
The actual holding of the Fourth Circuit in this case may not provide
seismic repercussions or the practitioner; however the court's application
of the federal standard of review set forth in Williams serves as a guide for
potential federal habeas review. This case also proves enlightening as to the
competing arguments of the minimum standards for voir dire set forth in
Morgan. The outcome of a defendant's trial rests heavily voir dire and the
defense attorney must tenaciously assert each constitutional claim of trial
error to ensure that the defendant receives a constitutionally guaranteed
impartial jury.
Jeremy P. White
38. Id. at 267 (intimating that if an instruction to disregard the information at the
previous phase of the proceeding were used and determined constitutionally necessary, the
outcome of the Simmons claim may have been in favor of the petitioner); see also Buchanan
v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417 (1987) (reaffirming that the state's interest in a single jury
deciding all the issues in a capital case of sentencing and guilt/innocence without indicating
a need for a jury instruction that one portion of evidence may not be considered in another
phase of the trial ; Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180 (1986) (relying u on previous
decisions which held that at capital sentencing a jury need not be instructedto e gard
evidence given at the guilt/innocence phase).
39. Oken, 220 F.3d at 268.
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